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EXCHANGE RATE VOLATILITY IN INTEGRATING CAPITAL MARKETS
ABS TRACT
This paper investigates the relationship between
international capital liberalization and exchange rate
volatility. While the effects of a capital controls
liberalization on the transaction volume in the foreign exchange
market are theoretically unambiguous, the effects on the
volatility of exchange rate can have either sign. On one hand,
the liberalization leads to increasing economy—wide and
investor-specific uncertainty. On the other hand, the augiented
number of participants in the market should reduce exchange rate
fluctuations. The uncertainty effects should be dominant in the
short run, while the increase in the number of traders in the
longer run should make the market thicker and tend to reduce
volatility. It is shown that, for a sample of countries which
have liberalized capital controls in the last 15 years,
structural breaks in the process generating exchange rate
volatility have occurred very close to the time when
liberalization measures were implemented. The results also
suggest an increase in volatility after the structural
breakpoint.
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New Haven, CT 065201. Introduction
The structure and openness of the international financial markets has significantly
changed in the last two decades. Financial deregulation has led to the internationalization
of the financial services industry while the progressive liberalization of international capital
movements has allowed, and was followed by, increasing cross—country portfolio
diversification. These developments have stimulated the growth of the world foreign
exchange markets, the size of which has increased enormously in the last decade. A crucial
factor has been the separation between trade motivated transactions and total transactions
in foreign exchange. There is empirical evidence that most of the turnover in the foreign
exchange markets is generated by financial transactions, a large part of which are of a
speculative nature (Arcelli et al. [1990 b]).
The objective of this paper is to investigate the relationship between the removal of
capital controls and exchange rate volatility. We first present, in section 2, a model of the
foreign exchange market which produces a simple relationship between volume of
transactions and exchange rate variability. One of the implications of the model is that
there exist changes in the structure of financial markets which generate a simultaneous
increase in the transaction volume and in the exchange rate variance. Next, in section 3,
we turn to the data. We search for possible structural breaks in the stochastic process
generating exchange rates and ask whether these breaks could be related to liberalization
measures. The conclusion that we reach is that, for most currencies, changes in the process
generating the exchange rate have occurred, and they happened close to the time in which
major capital market innovations took place.
In section 4, we explore some implications of the model when different exchange rate
regimes are taken into account. We also present some empirical evidence regarding the
EMS, suggesting that the progressive strengthening of the European exchange rate
agreements may have played a role in reducing liberalization—related volatility with
respect to non—EMS countries.—2—-
2. The model
In order to investigate the relationship between liberalization and exchange rate
volatility, consider a foreign exchange market where 3 agents trade currency A for currency
B'. For simplicity we assume that the desired net position in currency A of trader jat
time t is a linear function of the form:
(1) =
wheree is the :t exchange rate (defined as units of B currency for one unit of A
currency) and e,. is the reservation exchange rate for trader j, a function of his/her
expectations. Differently from the approach based on one representative agent, we want to
account explicitly for differences among participants in the market. Traders' heterogeneity
can be introduced in the model by assuming that the information known by different
individuals is not identical and, therefore, reservation prices (e.) vary among traders. If
e. > e, currency A is priced below trader j's reservation level, and thus he/she will want
to have a positive net position in currency A. Vice versa, if e. ce,currency A is more
appreciated than trader j's reservation level, and he/she will want to have a net positive
position in currency B.
In equilibrium, the following must hold:
(2)
that is, the exchange market clears. Together (1) and (2) imply:
I
Theforeign exchange market is modelled by adapting previous work on financial macket volatility and
transaction volume by Tauchen and Pitti [1983].—3—
1 *
(3) —e.=e J j=1
i.e.the average reservation exchange rate clears the market. From (3) it is immediate
that:
(4) Var(e) =Var[Le:.]
the variance of the exchange rate depends on the distribution of the traders' reservation
exchange rates. Informational shocks hit the economy every period, at both aggregate and




(6) E() = Var()=
and
= Var(.)=o.
Accordingly,is an economy wide shock, known by all agents, whileis idiosyncratic






Ifthe shocks are assumed to be mutually independent, both across traders and over time,
from (7) it follows that
(8) Var(e) s =+4.
Otherthings equal, an increase in the number of traders (J) tends to reduce the exchange
rate volatility. On the other hand, given J, a higher variance of both the aggregate and
idiosyncratic informational shocks raises the variance of the exchange rate.In what
follows, changes in the distribution of informational shocks and in the market size will be
related to the changes in the market regulatory structure.
Consider now the determination of the turnover. The volume of transactions in the
market at period t is given by the change in the traders's position between period t—1 and










Note that the Vt is not a function of informational shocks at the aggregate level, which in
turn determine e. The model thus predicts the possibility of price fluctuations with no—5—
corresponding fluctuations in the turnover.
Assuming that tj are iid -N(0 ,u ),itcan be shown that:
(11) E(Vt)=aj
(J—1)
The expected value of the trading volume is an increasing function of the number of
traders in the market. Note also that the average transaction volume is function of the
variancereflecting the average dispersion of individual reservation prices, but is not
related to the average variability of economic—wide shocksa.
What does this model tell us about the effects of a capital markets liberalization?
This approach highlights the importance of the distinction between short run and long run
analysis. In the framework of the model, it is natural to expect an increase in the variance
of both the aggregate and the idiosyncratic shocks when the liberalization occurs. The
regime change brought about by the elimination of capital controls will augment the
amount of information needed by the agents trading in the foreign exchange market. It
seem plausible that the degree of uncertainty will be higher, as reflected by larger values of
bothand o.If,in the short run, the number of traders J does not vary substantially,
the increasing uncertainty will produce a positive co—movement of the exchange rate
variance and the transaction volume. By (8) and (11), both variables are positively related
to o.Inthe short run, therefore, price volatility and transaction volume can be expected
to rise together3.
2 The model baa been developed by assuming stationarity of the process generating private agents'
reservation prices. Therefore, it implies stationarity of the stochastic process for the exchange rate. As
long as the main conclusions in this section are concerned this issue is not crucial. The whole model can
be easily recasted in terms of non stationary processes, by re—defining e as the exchange rate yield (i.e.
log[et] in terms of the notation in the text) and posing E() =E()=0.
3 International portfolio diversification effects are likely to play a crucial role in the short run increase of
transaction volume in the foreign exchange market. The increase in the amount of information needed at
the time of the liberalization can be better understood in the framework of the portfolio adjustment
which is likely to follow the removal of capital controls.—6—
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However, the liberalization also tends to increase the number of potential traders
and thus expand the size of the market over time. If this is thecase, the correlation
between exchange rate variability and transaction volume may reverse sign in the longrun.
As can be seen from (8) and (11), the transaction volume is a positive function of the
number of traders (J), while the exchange rate variance is a negative function of J. As J
increases, the markets become "thicker" and this, other things equal, reduces the need for
large variations in the exchange rate in order to reach an equilibrium price. In the long
run, therefore, the financial liberalization would tend to increase transaction volume and
reduce exchange rate fluctuations.
There is empirical evidence that actual liberalization policies havegenerated
considerable increase in the volume of transactions in the foreign exchange market(see
Arcelli et al. (1990)). The objective of this paper is to investigate whetherthey have also
generated a short run increase in the volatility of exchange rates, with a possible longrun
pattern reversal due to the thickening of the market.
Of course, the exchange rate volatility alsp reflects the attitudes of the domestic
monetary authorities towards exchange rate fluctuations. Policy related parameters are
included in a modified version of the model presented in Section 4. In thiscase, as
expected, the variance of the exchange rate depends also on the elasticity of the
government supply function with respect to deviations of the actuale from its desired
level. However, the main implications of the model are not affected and thedistinction
between short and long term consequences of the financial liberalizationcan still be drawn.
3. Empirical Evidence
A first piece of evidence regarding the volatility of exchange ratesover time is
provided by Table 1. Using daily data from January 1971 to May1989, monthly
coefficients of variation (i.e. sample standard deviation normalized by thesample mean) of
bilateral nominal exchange rates were calculated with respect to threecountries which have
pursued significant liberalization policies in the period. These countriesare as follows:—7—
Australia, where interest rate ceilings were rapidly relaxed at the beginning of the 1980's
and most foreign exchange controls were removed in December 1983; Japan, where
liberalization policies beginning in 1978 led to the elimination of restrictions on foreign
ownership in May 1979 (while the complete set of previous liberalization measuies were
formally recognized in December 1980); and the UK, where foreign exchange controls were
gradually relaxed starting in 1977 and completely eliminated in 1979.
Table 1 shows five—year averages of coefficients of variation. Notice that this
measure of volatility increases in correspondence with the liberalization periods. The
Japanese data also shows a reduction in the average coefficient of variation toward the end
of the sample.
Also, considering the period before and after the liberalization, the average monthly
coefficient of variation with respect to the US dollar rises from .56 to 1.32 percent for the
Australian dollar, from .81 to 1.28 percent for the Japanese Yen, from .86 to 1.33 percent
for the English sterling.The volatility of exchange rates is higher in the
post—liberalization period.
The prima facie evidence presented in Table 1 suggests that a liberalization of
capital movements might lead, at least in the short run, to an increase in the exchange rate
volatility. The next step is therefore to test more formally the hypothesis of a relation
between capital liberalization and exchange rate volatility.
In the framework of the model presented in section 2, the removal of capital controls
leads both to an increase of the transaction volume in the foreign exchange market and to a
change in the price variability. The volume effects are theoretically unambiguous. They
are also supported by an increasing body of empirical literature.
The sign of the effects on exchange rate volatility, however, is not unambiguous.
On one hand, liberalization policies can be seen as leading to higher level of uncertainty,
both economy—wide and trader—specific. On the other hand, the raising number of traders
improve the thickness of the market. In principle, following a liberalization episode,
exchange rate variability might either increase or fall.It could be argued that the—8—
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uncertainty—related effects are immediate, while the number of traders increases only over
time. In this case the exchange rate volatility is expected to rise as soon as the
liberalization process starts, while the thickening of the market becomes a relevant factor
over the longer run.
If financial deregulation leads to a change in the volatility of the exchange rate, it
must be the case that a change in the stochastic process generating the variable occurs in
correspondence with the liberalization period.
Therefore, a possible testing strategy consists of estimating the tinting of a
structural change in the stochastic process generating some measure of exchange rate
variability and comparing this result with the timing of the actual liberalization episode.
Clearly, the reasons why there might be a structural break in the volatility are numerous,
including changes in the exchange rate regime or in the distribution of some fundamentals
in the economy. The maintained view in this testing strategy assigns a preminent role to
changes in the regulatory structure of capital markets.
Notice that actual liberalization policies have been associated both with flexible
exchange rate regimes and with regimes of limited exchange rate flexibility. An example of
the second case is given by the EMS experience, where the removal of capital controls has
followed a process of progressive strengthening of the target zones regime, producing a
reduced exchange rate variability with regards to inter—EMS exchange rates.
On the other hand, the three countries in our sample, Australia, Japan and the UK,
witnessed a relatively rapid implementation of liberalization measures in 1983, 1978—80
and 1978—79, respectively, under a regime of floating exchange rates.
Foliowing the methodology adopted by Mankiw et al. [1987], two alternative sets of
tests were implemented in order to determine the most likely timing for a regime change in
the sample period. The first test endogenously determines a point in time as the most likely
switch date from one regime to the other. The second test allows the estimates of the
parameters characterizing the two regimes to vary gradually over time from the old to the
new values, resulting in an estimate of the adjustment speed between the two.—9—
The second test tries to capture the realistic idea that the move from a regime of
capital controls to one of liberalized capital flows is not instantaneous. First, liberalization
measures are generally implemented over a period of time (from one to three years in our
sample countries), suggesting that there is no single liberalization date. Second, once the
financial deregulation takes place, its effects on exchange rate volatility can take some time
to occur.
A first measure of variability is the monthly coefficient of variation for daily
bilateral exchange rates over the time span June 1973—May 1989.
3.1. A step switching test for the change in regime
Suppose that the process for the coefficient of variation (cvt) of the exchange rate is
as follows:
(12) cvt =si+ t =1,2 T5—l
cvt= 52+61t=T5T5+1T
where T5 is the switch date, i.e. the first period of the new regime. The objective is to use
a maximum likelihood procedure to estimate T5.
If we assume normal errors, the log likelihood function for the model is:
T51 cv —s T cv —
logL=—Tlog(v)+ S logN(t 1+ logN(t 2
t=1 t=T5
where s and s1 are the means of the coefficient of variation in the old and new regime,
respectively, r2 is the variance of the errorand N (.)isthe density function of a
standardized normal distribution. As in Mankiw et al. [1987] the maximum likelihood
value for T5 is found by computing the maximum likelihood estimates of the three— 10—
I
parameters of the model i' 2 and 2) for all possible T5's and then taking the value ofT5
with the maximum likelihood.
I
Once T5 is estimated, the structural change in the mean of the coefficient of
variation at the break date can be tested by using a simple log—likelihood test. The null




The corresponding test statistic is:
2(log NH—log H) -'
whereNH refers to the non—restricted model and R to the restricted model (i.e.
Table 2 reports the result of the step—switching test for the three countries in our
sample, with Germany and the USA taken as reference cases. The US dollar bilateral rates
with the Canadian dollar, Italian lira, and French franc and German mark will constitute
our control group.
To begin with, we focus on the coefficient of variation of each domestic currency vu
a vis the US dollar: this will provide a first empirical test for the hypothesis that the
structural breaks are due to the liberalization. The estimated switch points between
regimes are March 1978 for Japan, June 1979 for the UK and March 1983 for Australia.
Each of these estimated dates falls well within the corresponding liberalization period.
In all cases, the structural break occurs marginally before the actual implementation
of the complete set of liberalization measures. While capital controls are completely— 11—
removedin May 1979 in Japan, in October 1979 in the UK and in December 1983 in
Australia, in each of these countries significant steps towards liberalization are already
undertaken in the two year span preceding these dates.
It should also be observed that the likelihood ratio test consistently rejects the
equality of the mean coefficient of variation across the two sub—periods, the exchange rate
volatility being significantly higher alter the structural break.
It could be argued that the structural break might be due to a shift in the volatility
of the dollar rather than a country—specific change in regime. The dollar behavior
undoubtedly plays a central role in determining the upward trend in the bilateral exchange
rate variability beginning at the end of the Seventies. In particular, the change in operating
procedures of the U.S. monetary policy in November 1979 (with a move from soft monetary
targets to a tight non—borrowed reserves target) led to high interest rate volatility between
1980 and 1982 when the monetarist experiment was eventually dropped. The new monetary
policy procedures are reflected in the increase in the volatility of the dollar during that
period. Nonetheless, if the volatility breaks in our sample were due to the U.S. monetary
policy, the breaking points in the bilateral rates with the US dollar should tend to coincide
for most currencies, whether or not the country has undertaken liberalization policies.
However, switch dates differ considerably not only across Australian dollar, Japanese yen
and the English sterling, but also between these and the additional currencies reported in
Table 2. In particular, the estimated break for the Australian dollar, Japanese yen and the
English sterling occur either before or after the change in U.S. policy (March 1978 for
Japan and June 1979 for the U.K. —March1983 for Australia). Note also that the switch
points for Italian lira, French franc and German mark (relative to the dollar) happen at the
same date (March 1980). The common break—point is not surprising considering that these
currencies were tied together by the March 1979 EMS arrangements. This break date is
likely to be the outcome of the increased volatility of the dollar following the change in the
U.S. monetary policy at the beginning of 1980.
Consider now the bilateral exchange rate between the currencies of the countries—i2—
where the liberalization took place. Since they have liberalized at different dates, the break
in volatility might reflect the effects of the liberalization in either country. In principle
more than one break in the series is possible; more plausibly, the break should occur at the
date of the most recent policy change.
The evidence in Table 2 is mixed. On one hand, the Australian late liberalization
seems to determine the timing of the shift quite consistently across currencies, as the
switch points with respect to the bilateral rates with Japan and the UK occur in February
1985 and September 1984, respectively. This is three to six quarters after the final
liberalization measures were implemented in Australia. However, as will be shown in the
next section, the estimated adjustment period from a regime of limited capital mobility to
one of a free capital movement is three years. This may suggest some delays in the
adjustment.Also, the radical policy changes enacted at the beginning of 1985 are
associated with a strong depreciation of the Australian dollar4. The upsurge in volatility
in that year is likely to shift the break forward.
On the other hand, the break point for the yen vU a S the sterling occurs earlier
than the beginning of the liberalization process. There are several potential explanations
for this early estimated break. First, while capital controls were completely eliminated in
the UK only in October 1979, significant liberalization policies were already started in
1977;forexample, in that year capital controls on non—residents were eliminated and
foreign exchange restrictions on financial intermediaries were relaxed. Thus, the exchange
rate volatility might have increased in the 1977—79 period because of expectations that
capital controls would soon be completely removed. Second, the changes in monetary
control procedures in 1976—77, i.e. the introduction of explicit monetary targets, might
have increased both interest and exchange rate volatility. Third, and most important, the
4 As the Australian economy recovered from the 1982/83 recession, the current account deficitsas a
percentage of gdp doubled, reaching almost 6%. External and internal imbalance led to marked policy
changes starting in 1985 (tightening of both monetary and racal policies, as well as the adoption of
income policies). The Australian dollar, largely depreciated in the first half of 1985, further weakened in
mid—1986.—13—
severe crisis of the pound sterling in 1976, reflected by the temporary high volatility of this
currency in that year (see for example Figure 4), have biased the estimate of the break
point for the pound/Yen rate towards an early date5. The above points can help explain
the English currency behavior as captured by the additional tests performed in the
remaining sections of this paper.
The breaking dates for the Australian dollar, the yen and the sterling vis—a--vjsthe
German mark are 1985, April 1987 and December 1981, respectively. Nonetheless, for both
the yen and the sterling the switch is toward a regime of decreasedvariability.In the case
of the U.K., this result is not surprising, given the decision by the British Chancellor
Lawson to peg (implicitly) the pound to the German mark in 1987: the break date and the
fall in volatility in this case captures the informal membership of the U.K in the EMS. On
the other hand, the considerable reduction in mark/yen volatility might have reflected the
medium—long run consequences of liberalization policies as discussed in section 2; however,
the estimated break date is quite early for these effects to have occurred.
One may wonder whether the above results depend on choosing the coefficient of
variation as the volatility measure. A new round of tests has thus been performed by using
monthly variances of the exchange rate daily growth rates (or daily yields). The
corresponding results are reported in Table 36.
Switchpoints for Japan are virtually identical to those in Table 2. The Australian
break point of January 1984 vis a vis the US dollar now coincides with the actual
liberalization date (December 1983). The other Australian break points occur in 1985, in
accordance with the results in Table 2. The English sterling pattern is also consistent with
In order to control for the crisis of the pound and its high volatility in 1976 we run step—switching
regressions that exclude that year from the sample. In that case, the break point for the pound/yen rate
is estimated to occur in November 1977; that is, right in the middle of the liberlisation process for the
U.K. and Japan.
6Additionaltests can been performed by using the variance of the daily exchange rate growth rates.
Given the characteristics of the their unconditional distribution, non parametric tests are the most
appropriate. Nonetheless, a tentative application of the endogenous switching procedure to the F—test
for equality of sub—eample variances has produced results which are strikingly consistent with those in
Table 3.—14—
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the previous results. The estimated break date is October 1977 with respect both to the
U.S. Dollar and to the Japanese Yen. This is well inside the liberalization period even if
the high volatility of the pound during the 1976 crisis tends to bias the break date towards
a date (end of 1977) that is earlier than the final liberalization measures (1978—79).
One of the disadvantages of the test procedure followed so far is that the switch
from one regime to the other is identified with a single point in time. However, the
liberalization of capital controls is usually a process over time and, in general, it is sensible
to talk about a llberalization period rather than an exact liberalization date.
The test in the next section will directly address the issue of gradualness in the
switch from one regime to the other. As a result, an estimate of the speed of adjustment
between regimes will be obtained7.
3.2. A logistic switching test
Assume that at each point in time the parameter s of the process generating CV is
not constant but is a logistic function of time. The logistic—suñtching model will therefore
be as follows:
(13) cvt= 5tvt t=1 T
(14) s=(1—L(t))s+ L(t)2
where s and have the same meaning as before, vt is a normal i.i.d. error corresponding
Oneway to give a degree of confidence to the point estimates of the regime change date is to compute
the posterior odds ratio for alternative dates of regime switch. This ratio allows to find the time region
over which it is likely that the regime change has occurred, conditioning on the data. This gives a
confidence measure of how likely it is that the liberalization actually occurred in the period aiound the
switching point. This posterior odds ratio is computed as:
POR= exp (log Lt —log LT
i.e. the posterior odds ratio is the ratio of the likelihood values for different switch dates.— 15—




In each period, the estimated value of s will be a convex combination of the
parameters values in the two regimes. The inflection point of the logistic, occurring at
t=—(a/5), will give the date at which both regimes will be equally weighted, i.e.
L(t)=(1—L(t))=1/2.This point will be reported as switching date between regimes.
Notice that considering this rather than other points as switching date is arbitrary and the
estimates are not directly comparable with those reported in section 3.1. This is because
the logistic switching test imposes some restrictions, such as symmetry in the adjustment
process, which are ahsent from the previous testing procedure.
The rate of change of the parameters value from s tois captured by 5. Notice,
though, thatis reached only asymptotically, since L(t)—'i for t—'co. Nonetheless, it is
useful to present an estimate of the time needed to complete some pre—specified part of the
adjustment between the two regimes.
Following Mankiw et al. [1987], consider a fraction 1/2 of the adjustment around
the inflection point, i.e. the period in which the weight on the new regime passes from 1/4
to 3/4. Define the dates L(t(1/4)) and L(t(3/4)) implicitly as L(t(1/4))=1/4 and
L(t(3/4))=3/4. The difference between the second and the first date will be the desired
estimate of the time period needed to complete one half of the adjustment around the
inflection point. It is easy to show that
t(3/4)—t(1/4)=log(9)/5
where, as expected, the adjustment time is inversely related to the parameter 5.
Theempirical evidence is presented in Table 3 and in Figures 1 through 3. The—16—
bilateral Japan/US series is characterized by the shortest adjustment time, 11 months with
the first date t(1/4) being in February 1977 and the the second date t(3/4) being December
1979. It can be observed that, while the liberalization process started in 1977 in Japan,
most liberalization measures were introduced in 1978—79. In this sense the logistic
switching model estimates an adjustment period that is shorter than the actual
liberalization process. In the Australia/USA case, t(1/4) corresponds to February 1980 and
t(3/4) is in December 1983, with 33 month adjustment. This period covers quite precisely
the liberalization process in Australia that started in early 1980 and was completed in
1983.
In the UK/USA case the change between regimes is estimated to take place over a
period of 111 months: certainly too long an adjustment period.This result can be
explained by observing that the extreme exchange rate variability of the pound in 1976
prevents the test from adequately accounting for the differences across the two regimes8.
In order to control for the extreme volatility of the pound in 1976, we re—run the logistic
switching model by excluding that year from the sample. In this case the adjustment period
estimate falls to 62 months, starting in February 1976 (t(1/4)) and ending in March 1980
(t(3/4)). While this second regression still results in a relatively long adjustment process
between regimes, it captures the entire liberalization period of the pound in the second half
of the 1970's.
In conclusion, the empirical evidence suggests that episodes of capital liberalization
are associated with significant structural breaks in the variability of the exchange rate,
leading to a systematic volatility increase in the short run. In a first stage, thus,
uncertainty—related effects of liberalization measures seem to prevail.
8Theperformance of the logistic switching test depends, among other things, on two crucial features of
the series, which are its lenght and the size of the step in the volatility of exchange rates from one regime
to the other. In the case of the coefficients of variation for the bilateral rate UK/USA, the high volatility
in 1976 reduces the step between the two regimes considerably, stretching the fitted curve as it appears
in Figure 3.— 17—
4.Liberalizationand ezchange rate regimes: implication for the EMS
The model in section 2 does not take into explicit consideration the Monetary
Authorities. It is obvious that their behavior will significantly affect both the level and
volatility of the exchange rate. While there is no simple way of embodying policy rules in
the process generating private agents differentiated beliefr, the model can be readily
modified to provide some insights about the role played by alternative exchange rate
regimes if we assume that the government behavior enters the individual j's reservation
price only through the i.i.d. information shocks.
Consider a Central Bank's net supply function in terms of foreign currency of the
form:
(15) It =A (e—)
whereis some objective in terms of the level of exchange rate and Aisa reaction
parameter.
The equilibrium condition (2) will now be as follows
(2') =It
which, together with (1), (2) and (6) will yield
(7') e=°'[ + + J =i A+cxJ
Note that in the case of a pure floating exchange rate regime, A=O, 1=0 for all
Expression (7') and (7) coincide.
Suppose now that the monetary authority "leans against the wind" with A>O. We— 18—
report results for three specifications of the policy objective ,namelye1, E(e) and a
constant e.
When the government behavior will make the exchange rate level function
of the infinite series of past information shocks:
J
(16) e =
[ [ t_i+ _!_.
withvariance given by
(17) Var(e) =j)2 2+
which is clearly lower than the variance (8) characterizing a free floating regime. Observe
that Var(e) approaches zero as .\—cc.
Alternatively, ifis defined as the rate level expected by the market, i.e. E(e), we
can derive e and its variance as follows:
(18) e= J j=1
(19) Var(e) = aJ 2 2
+_
A+oJ J
Notice that in each period e will be a convex combination of the free floating
exchange rate level (first term in the right hand side of (1.4)) and the constant expected
exchange rate level, given the process generating the information shocks (second term in
the RHS of (1.4)). The weight on the second term is proportional to the intervention— 19—
parameterA.Again,the exchange rate variance approaches zero as Agoesto infinity.




wherethe variance is inversely related to A.
Twointeresting issues with respect to the EMS countries can be addressed in the
framework of this model.
The first concerns the effects of the removal of capital controls while there is a
movement towards a regime of limited exchange rate flexibility.
The model helps interpret the standard rationale for late implementation of
liberalization measures in most EMS countries, implementation which has come only alter
a long and gradual process of consolidation of the exchange rate bands. Within the
framework of the model, this process can he interpreted not only in terms of positive values
for Aassociatedwith a band for e, but also in terms of a steady reduction of the dispersion
parameters a0 and a during the shift towards a target zone regime.The
uncertainty—related effects of the liberalization are then llmited by the increased
macroeconomic stability.
Nevertheless, the liberalization might increase potential disturbances in the
inter—EMS exchange rates in the short run. In order to insure the stability of exchange
rates within the bands, therefore, an even greater degree both of exchange rate intervention
(a higher A)andpollcy coordination could be called for. In the longer run, however, the
increasing thickness in foreign exchange markets (together with greater degree of portfolio
diversification) should tend to reduce exchange rate volatility9.
Given the available sample period, the endogenous regime switching techniques described in Section 3
are not suitable to analine EMS—related regime shifts between European currencies. The consolidation of
European target zones has resulted in a negative trend in the inter—EMS exchange rate variability
throughout the Eighties. This period could be seen as a long adjustment process toward a regime of
reduced volatility, which is not yet represented adequately in the sample.Moreover, extensive—20—
The second question refers to possible effects of the EMS agreements on the bilateral
exchange rate volatility with respect to non EMS countries. The issue is whether or not the
European Monetary System reduces volatility from external sources, such as liberalization
policies pursued by non EMS countries.
Table 5 reports step—switching test results for Germany, France, Italy and the
Netherlands with respect to Australia, Japan and the UK. In two cases, Japan and the
UK, the volatility decreases in the second period.
The Australian case is different because of the importance of the re—direction of
both internal and external policies in 1985. Given the successive depreciations of the
Australian dollar during the 1985—86 period, the exchange rate variability increases in the
late eighties with respect to the rest of the sample.
The UK—related results dearly reflect the informal English membership in the EMS
since 1987. The effects of this membership on exchange rate variability are more apparent
at the end of our sample.
Most interestingly, the yen average variability is lower from the beginning of 1981
on in the case of Germany and the Netherlands, from the beginning of 1983 on in the case
of Italy and from mid—86 on in the case of France. In the framework of the considerations
discussed at the end of Section 2, one could argue that these results reflect the long run
effects of capital deregulation.Alternatively, one may suspect that the increasing
importance of the inter—EMS ties during the could have played a role in reducing the Yen
volatility quite consistently across the EMS countries. However, as shown in Tables 1 and
2, this role for the EMS cannot be detected considering bilateral rates with respect to the
dollar (the US dollar related volatility increases in the eighties).
While additional empirical work is necessary in order to verify the hypothesis above,
the prima facie empirical evidence suggests that volatility—reducing effects of the EMS
exchange rate agreements could be detected also with respect to non member countries.
liberalization policies have been implemented only very recently, precluding the possibility of a thorough
assessment of the experience.—21 —
5.Conclusions
The growth in the volume of transactions in the foreign exchange markets has risen
dramatically in the last decade, to an extent that cannot be explained only by the increase
in the volume of trade in goods and services. Most of the turnover in these markets is
generated by financial operations, a large part of which are speculative in nature.
Moreover, this rise in the volume of transactions has occurred jointly with an increase in
the degree of exchange rate volatility. Foreign exchange markets have become more
unstable leading to concerns about the "excess volatility" of exchange rates under
unrestricted capital mobility.
This paper investigated the sign of the relationship between international capital
liberalization, and exchange rate volatility.While the effects of a capital controls
liberalization on the transaction volume in the foreign exchange market are theoretically
unambiguous, the effects on the volatility of exchange rate can have either sign. On one
hand, the liberalization leads to increasing economy—wide and investor—specific
uncertainty. On the other hand, the augmented number of participants in the market
should reduce exchange rate fluctuations. The uncertainty effects should be dominant in
the short run, while the increase in the number of traders in the longer run should make
the market thicker and tend to reduce volatility.
In section 3 it has been shown that, for a sample of countries which have liberalized
capital controls in the last 15 years, structural breaks in the process generating exchange
rate volatility have occurred very close to the time when liberalization measures were
implemented. The results also suggest an increase in volatility after the structural break
point.
While some caveats should be kept in mind in assessing the reported empirical
evidence (in particular the possible coexistence of different factors determining the break),
the empirical evidence proves to be quite consistent with the analytical framework
discussed in Section 2.
What considerations do these results suggest about the effects of capital—22 —
liberalizationin the EMS countries? The implications of the model are twofold.
First, the analytical model helps interpret the standard rationale for late
implementation of liberalization measures, after the macroeconomic environment becomes
sufficiently stable.This allows to reduce the uncertainty—related effects of the
liberalization. On the other band, short run potential disturbances in the inter—EMS
exchange rates can still arise from the removal of capital controls, calling for higher degrees
of intervention and policy coordination. Nonetheless, volatility—reducing effects are at
work along with the increase of market thickness in the longer run.
Second, the empirical evidence suggests a potential role of the EMS in reducing
bilateral volatility of EMS currencies with respect to the Yen, calling for additional
empirical research in this area.—23 —
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MONTHLY COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION OF
BILATERAL EXCHANGE RATE
AU USA JA USA UK USA
1971—1974 0.46 0.63 0.58
1975—1979 0.56 0.82 0.86
1980—1984 0.60 1.35 1.18
1985—1989 1.32 1.21 1.43
JAAUUKAUJAUK
1971—1974 0.70 0.77 0.74
1975—1979 0.81 0.80 0.98
1980—1984 1.09 1.01 1.35
1985—1989 1.53 1.59 1.11
CA USAIT USA FR USAGE USA
1971—1974 0.22 0.57 0.81 0.91
1975—1979 0.41 0.77 0.82 0.92
1980—1984 0.47 1.06 1.23 1.17
1985—1989 0.47 1.29 1.35 1.43
AUSTRALIA: mean CV before liberalization 0.56
after liberalization 1.32
JAPAN: mean CV before liberalization 0.81
after liberalization 1.28




MONTHLY COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION
(Sample 73:6—89:5)
SWITCHLR TEST CV FIRST CV SECOND CV
DATE PERIODPERIOD
Australia vs. USA 83:3 34.31 0.53 1.28 0.83
Japan vs. USA 78:3 41.97 0.62 1.31 1.1
UK vs. USA 79:6 28.66 0.82 1.34 1.14
Australia vs Japan 85:2 25.55 0.96 1.75 1.17
Japan va. UK 76:3 12.08 0.74 1.2 1.12
UK vs. Australia 84:9 23.76 0.96 1.69 1.18
Canada vs USA 76:12 15.78 0.27 0.47 0.43
Italy vs USA 80:3 21.59 0.77 1.26 1.05
France vs USA 80:3 16.75 0.92 1.35 1.17
Germany vs USA 80:3 11.54 1.02 1.37 1.22
Australia vs. Germany 85:3 21.07 1.09 1.79 1.28
Japan vs Germany 81:12 14.99 1.2 0.87 1.05

































































MONTHLY COEFFICIENTS OF VARIATION
(Sample 73:6—89:5)
INFLECTION POINT MONTHS FOR 1/2 OF THE SWITCH
AROUND THE INFLECTION POINT
Australia vs USA 81:7 33
Japan vs. USA 77:6 11
UK vs USA (1) 78:6 62
Australia vs Japan 80:10 40
Japan vs UK 74:3 41
UK vs. Australia 81:4 36
(1) Excluding 1976Table 5
AUSTRALIA, JAPAN AND THE UK AND THE ENS
(Sample 73:6—89:5)
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